

Ageing of hazardous installations


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What is the IChemE Safety Centre? Current Operating and Industry Partners




Current supporting partners and collaborators



SIT LEARN



Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen



Engineering



What is ageing?

“AGEING IS NOT ABOUT HOW OLD YOUR EQUIPMENT IS; IT’S ABOUT WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT ITS CONDITION, AND HOW THAT’S CHANGING OVER TIME”

(Plant ageing RR509 HSE, UK 2006)



Aspects of ageing

Ageing is a multi-aspect phenomenon

- Equipment
- Memory/expertise
- Procedures/technology



The challenge

From the day of their construction:

- Older facilities see significant developments and changes in engineering, policy and regulations, and in the overall socio-economic conditions under which they operate.
- Introduction of legislative frameworks, the development of new safety standards and new operating procedures following new discoveries in science and engineering - need for an upgrade in many of the facilities.



Equipment – physical ageing

- Modifications/ Change of use
- Obsolescence
- Degradation – fiberglass and concrete, too
- Wear and tear
- Control systems manual/electromechanical
- Electrical and electronic systems
- Safety systems; standard and provision
- Retrospective HAZOP; procedural fixes
- Corrosion under insulation



People

- Fluctuation
- Loss of corporate memory
- Change in role
- Retirement – loss of continuity
- Reorganisation
- Transfer of knowledge
- Lack of knowledgeable expertise from suppliers
- Third party workers
- Perception that knowledge can be bought in



Procedures

- Documents
- Operating procedures
- Standards
- Loss of records for inspection and maintenance
- Failure to update map/drawings/contact list
- Change in ownership/reorganisation
- Loss of documentation about design
- Operating procedures obsolete



Common issues

- The engagement of third party personnel – insufficient knowledge
- Missing or incomplete documentation on the design, operation and history of the facility
- Loss of knowledge about the design and operation of the plant
- Inappropriate design of the equipment (premature ageing)
- Inadequate inspection plans
- Inspection body reduces frequency of inspections
- Lack of Hazard identification/risk assessment



How to measure - metrics

Elements	Metrics
Knowledge and competence	Conformance with Process Safety related role competency requirement
Engineering and design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deviations to safety critical elements (SCE) Short term deviation to SCE Open management of change on SCEs Demand on SCE Barriers failing on demand
Systems and procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SCE Inspections Performed Versus Planned Barriers fail on test Damage to primary containment detected on test/inspection SCE maintenance deferrals (approved corrective maintenance deferrals following risk assessment) Temporary operating procedures (TOPs) open Permit to work checks performed to plan Permit to work non-conformance Number of process safety related emergency response drills to plan
Assurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of process safety related audits to plan Number of non conformances found in process safety audits
Human factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Compliance with critical procedures by observation Critical alarms per operator hour (EEMUA, 1999) Standing alarms (EEMUA, 1999)
Culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open process safety items Number of process safety interactions that occur



Engineering & design

- Deviations to SCE
- Short term deviation to SCE
- Open management of change on SCE
- Demand on SCE
- Barriers failing on demand



Engineering & design ageing

- Corrosion
- Erosion
- Obsolescence
- Fatigue
- Worn equipment



Systems & procedures

- SCE inspections performed verses planned
- Barriers fail on test
- Damage to primary containment detected on test/inspection
- SCE maintenance deferrals
- Temporary operating procedures
- Permit to work checks performed to plan
- Permit to work non conformance
- Number of process safety related emergency response drills to plan



Systems & procedures- ageing

- SCE fit for purpose
- Obsolescent emergency response plan and operating procedures in place
- Inspection programme is not updated
- Switch from analogue to digital



Assurance

- Number of process safety related audits to plan
- Number of non conformances found in process safety audits



Assurance - ageing

- Audits should address aspects related to ageing
- Follow-up after audit and implementation of findings
- Monitoring sign of ageing
- Record data



Human factors

- Compliance with critical procedures by observation
- Critical alarms per operator hour
- Standing alarms



Human factors - ageing

- People can age
- Lack of transfer of knowledge



Culture

- Open process safety items
- Number of process safety interactions that occur



Culture - ageing

- Process knowledge is maintained and transferred
- Keeping records of installation specifications



ISC Safety Lore

- Case studies
- Key learning points
- „What can I do” session
- An mp3 podcast of all Lores

<https://www.icheme.org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/safety-lore/>

<https://soundcloud.com/user-182199992/talking-safety-lore-dec-2018>



Case study - corrosion

- A pipe in the crude distillation unit ruptured, releasing flammable hydrocarbon process fluid.
- The flammable liquid partially vaporized into a large vapor cloud engulfing nineteen employees.
- After two minutes the flammable portion of the vapor cloud ignited.
- All of the employees escaped, narrowly avoiding serious injury.



Key learning points

- Poor operating procedures in regard to mechanical integrity.
- Operator overlooked:
 - Pipe wall thinning due to sulphidation corrosion
 - Over a period of 35 years, the piping component lost 90% of original wall thickness near the rupture.
- A team of experts on site in sulphidation corrosion but not involved in decision making within the unit affected.
- Lack of hazard identification.
- Inherently safer design – material selection.
- Ineffective inspection.



Challenges

- Plant integrity – recognition of ageing assets.
- Maintenance – inspections and testing needs to adapt to the equipment; changes in age and condition are constant
- Leadership – auditing, monitoring, prioritising.
- Competence – skills, knowledge and expertise relevant are present and taken into consideration.
- Identification of SCE and have them documented.
- Resources – knowledge is transferred and maintained.
- MoC – change of ownership and other changes.
- Being an intelligent customer – third party workers.
- Hazard identification and risk assessment – understanding degradation methods and address in.
- Design – archive of old plant layouts, maps, documents and parameter settings.



Strategies

Replacement strategy and assessing remaining life

- Understanding the base line conditions/performance
- E.g.: function, availability & reliability
- Check if historical data is available about degradation rate
- Involvement of experts on the related field.
- Understanding maintenance records data – what do they tell us?
- Setting priority in measuring performance – not same rigour to address everything.
- Consider audience – CEO look for data to support financial decisions; operations managers look for data to support replacement strategy.



Questions



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