

# **Incident investigation from an industry's perspective**

Zero incidents by Learning from Incidents

12 December 2018


# Willem Peuscher – Board member Tripod Foundation

ΕU

WWW .energyinst.org



- Willem Peuscher's background
- From Incident investigation → Learning from incident(s).
- Considerations for discussions around selection of incident investigations techniques








|  | foundation                | SafetyLeadersFoundation  |
|--|---------------------------|--|
| 1984-2016  | 2006 - current            | 2017 - current   |
| Chemical, Upstream,<br>Central office and field<br>operations; HSE | Energy institute 2013     | Preventing (fatal)<br>incidents at the<br>workplace                      |
| Incident investigation,<br>Permit to Work                          | Board member and assessor | Board member   |
| Life-Saving Rules  |                           | Learning from incidents;<br>Serious gaming<br>animations for workforce 2 |

What does industry want from investigations?

## Why to investigate incidents?



You do all the effort to arrive at zero incidents in future



**Pathological** – who is to blame, compliance with law?

**Reactive** –what went wrong and how

Calculative - why did it happen?

**Pro-actice** – What are behaviourial learnings for leaders

**Generative** – continuous organisational learning, always alert.



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What are the questions you have as investigator?



Viewing this example – what are the questions you would have as investigator? And what are the questions you have as leader of an organisation?

What happened? How it happened? Why it happened? What are the learnings? For whom are the learnings? How to sustain the learnings?

### **Example of incident**



### What happened till 0:40 sec





IOGP incident #7583 Fatalities: 1 Region: Europe Country: Germany Location: Onshore Year: 2006

Production May/June 2018 Amsterdam Copyright animations: Safety Leaders Foundation Copyright icons: IOGP Language version: English Animation by: www.Jeroenbrinkhuls.com Further queries to info@safetyleadersfoundation.com

> <u>Link</u> vimeo <u>Link</u> PC

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
# International Association of Oil & Gas Producers

What are the questions you have as investigator?



Viewing this example – what are the questions you would have as investigator? And what are the questions you have as leader of an organisation?

What happened? - chronology How it happened? – 'causal' Why it happened? – 'root causes' What are the learnings? For whom are the learnings? How to sustain the learnings?



**Example of incident** 

### How it happened from 0:40 sec





IOGP incident #7583 Fatalities: 1 Region: Europe Country: Germany Location: Onshore Year: 2006

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energy

<u>link</u>



# International Association of Oil & Gas Producers

### Learning from incident: what should investigation answer?





supervisors



leaders



Can it happen to me?

Will I be fired if I make a fault

Can I refuse to do a job if is seems risky

Concern about victim and family and colleagues

How to set the right conditions so the worker can do job safe?

How to prevent reoccurrence for in the future

Concern about victim and family and colleagues

I cut budget and we got cheaper labourers. Did that have an impact?

Is our safety culture right?



**Learning from** incident: what should investigation answer?





know the right way of working and know what can go wrong





What



Know what effects the behaviour of workers and then set the right work conditions

Why Root causes



Set the right culture and organisation

**Investigation technique to** facilitate various level questions

## What Chronology



Actions by people in the field

enera Ball valve: Did workers know about residual pressure in ball valves? Were they suspicious if handle is in closed position; Did

How Causal



supervisors

**Ball valve:** was it normal practice Conditions set by to check all pipework before issuing Permit to Work? Were workers who isolated the piping competent about trapped energy?; Did supervisor validate conditions in the field? Was there time pressure:

they feel OK to ask about residual


pressure?

Why Root causes



Organisational aspects and cultures by leaders

**Ball valve**: was time to prepare for the Turnaround enough?; was supervisor able to spend enough time in the field? was the culture to do all work safely? Was competence assurance part of contractor bid/selection?







who is involved, what can I do differently, how can we set the right preconditions



relevant LFI selected and sent to teams



Watch during team session




**Discuss and Learn** 

summarise learning

Most successful example of Learning from Incidents in industry

#### Examples of repeated fatalities in Shell 1998-2008



75% reduction in fatal incidents in 3 years time, >90% after 10 years Zero incidents by Learning from Incidents is possible!



#### Life-Saving Rules







## **Back up slides**

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Incident **investigation** methods should clarify **what** happened and **how**. There are many tools to help to visualise and create a structure

Incident analysis methods should help to clarify why it happened. There are limited amount of tools to help.

Notes:

It is **not** the man who reported the incident or had the incident who is **to blame**. He was probably the last man who prevented the incident from happening, but when he made an error the incident happened. There were many before him in the line of control who made errors. (Hind sight bias - easy to blame afterwards)

All victims left home before work, with the intention to return home.

Focus on behaviour of these workers and investigate backwards on how that behaviour was cultivated in the organisation by direct supervisors, leaders and top management.

There are many people who have a stake in the incident causation, from minutes before the incident to months and maybe years before the incident happened.


For industry serious incidents: there should always be a management system which analysed serious incidents including single type of fatalities. These systems use measures and controls to prevent the incidents to happen. These control were less effective, often due to human action. The key to improve is the understanding of why people acted as they acted





The only way to find out **how** and **why** things happened: try to find out why people acted as they acted.





**Figure 11: Investigation** 

#### Incident investigation techniques and analysis techniques

Reference:

Energy Institute: link



Table A2: Analysis methods features

|    |     |   | Training<br>required |       | -based or<br>ftware | Retrospective<br>analysis of<br>incident reports | Used in<br>petroleum<br>industry | Generates<br>graphical content<br>(e.g. timeline) | Complete<br>method for<br>incident analysis | Provides<br>solutions | Includes checklists<br>or flow diagrams | Comments   |
|----|-----|---|----------------------|-------|---------------------|--|----------------------------------|---|---|-----------------------|---|--|
| Γ  |     |   |                      | Paper | Software            |  |                                  |   |   |                       |   |  |
|    | 1.  | ARCA - APOLLO Root Cause<br>Analysis  | 1                    | 1     | 1                   | 1  | 1                                | 1   | 1   | 1                     |   | Described as a general problem solving<br>method   |
|    | 2.  | Black Bow Ties  |                      | 1     | 1                   |  | 1                                | 1   |   |                       |   |  |
|    | 3.  | DORI – Defining Operational<br>Readiness to Investigate   |                      | 1     |                     |  |                                  |   |   |                       |   | Not an analysis method – describes how to<br>conduct an investigation  |
|    | 4.  | ECFA – Events and Causal<br>Analysis (Charting) and<br>ECFA+ - Events and<br>Conditional Factors Analysis |                      | 1     |                     |  |                                  | 1   |   |                       |   | Part of the MORT method but is often used<br>as a charting method in an<br>investigation/analysis to provide graphical<br>depiction of incident  |
|    | 5.  | Fishbone diagram  |                      | 1     |                     | 1  |                                  | 1   |   |                       |   | Purely a method for graphically presenting<br>results; software systems available to help<br>draw  |
| 20 | 6.  | HERA – Human Error<br>Repository and Analysis<br>System   |                      | 1     | 1                   | 1  |                                  |   |   |                       |   |  |
|    | 7.  | HERA-JANUS – Human Error<br>Reduction In ATM (Air Traffic<br>Management)                                  | 1                    | 1     |                     | 1  |                                  | 1   | 1   |                       | 1                                       |  |
|    | 8.  | HFACS – The Human Factors<br>Analysis and Classification<br>System  | 1                    |       |                     | 1  |                                  |   |   |                       | 1                                       | Classification system only – aviation based, would need to adapt   |
|    | 9.  | HFAT – Human Factors<br>Analysis Tools  | 1                    | 1     | 1                   | 1  | 1                                | 1   | 1   | 1                     | 1                                       | Can be applied to any type of behaviour and<br>has been used as a proactive method in risk<br>assessment   |
|    | 10. | HFIT – Human Factors<br>Investigation Tool  | 1                    | 1     | 1                   |  |                                  | 1   | 1   |                       | 1                                       |  |
|    | 11. | HSYS - Human System<br>Interactions   | 1                    | 1     | 1                   |  | 1                                |   |   |                       | 1                                       | Can be used for proactive analysis in risk<br>assessment   |
|    | 12. | ICAM - Incident Cause<br>Analysis Method  | 1                    | 1     | 1                   | 1  | 1                                | 1   | 1   | 1                     | 1                                       |  |
|    | 13. | MEDA – the Maintenance<br>Error Decision Aid  | 1                    | 1     |                     |  | 1                                | 1   | 1   | J                     | 1                                       | Maintenance error; contains basic solutions<br>but relies on the user to identify definitive<br>improvements. There are examples, however<br>the user/interviewee needs to really come up<br>with the definitive improvements; use other<br>tools with MEDA e.g. timeline, police<br>interview methods |

#### Incident investigation techniques and analysis techniques

Reference:

Energy Institute: link



#### Table A2 continued.

|     |  | Training | Damor | -based or | Retrospective                   | Used in               | Generates                            | Complete                        | Provides  | Includes checklists | Comments  |
|-----|--|----------|-------|-----------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------|---------------------|---|
|     |  | required |       | ftware    | analysis of<br>incident reports | petroleum<br>industry | graphical content<br>(e.g. timeline) | method for<br>incident analysis | solutions | or flow diagrams    | Comments  |
|     |  |          | Paper | Software  |                                 |                       |                                      |                                 |           |                     |   |
| 14. | MORT – Management<br>Oversight and Risk Tree   | 1        | 1     | 1         | 1                               | 1                     | 1                                    | 1                               |           | 1                   |   |
| 15. | PEAT – the Procedural Event<br>Analysis Tool   | 1        | 1     | 1         |                                 |                       |                                      |                                 |           | 1                   | Flight crew error – can be adapted  |
| 16. | PRISMA – Prevention and<br>Recovery Information System<br>for Monitoring and Analysis  | 1        | 1     |           | 1                               | 1                     | 5                                    | 1                               | 1         | J                   | Was designed for retrospective analysis and<br>to collect and structure data on incidents   |
| 17. | SCAT® – Systematic Cause<br>Analysis Technique   | 1        | 1     | 1         |                                 | 1                     |                                      | 1                               | 1         | 1                   | Provides an indication of 'areas for corrective<br>action' rather than ready-made solutions   |
| 18. | SOL – Safety through<br>Organisational Learning  | 1        | 1     | 1         |                                 |                       | 1                                    | 1                               | 1         | 1                   | The software version, Sol-VE includes a<br>module for identifying corrective actions  |
| 19. | SOURCE™ – Seeking Out<br>the Underlying Root Causes<br>of Events                       | 1        | 1     | 1         |                                 | 1                     |                                      | 1                               |           | 1                   | Does not provide solutions but includes a<br>checklist to help develop solutions. Does not<br>generate graphical content, but recommends<br>the use of fault trees or causal analysis<br>charting |
| 20. | Step   | 1        | 1     |           |                                 |                       | 1                                    |                                 |           | 1                   |   |
| 21. | Storybuilder   | 1        |       | 1         | 1                               |                       | 1                                    | 1                               |           |                     | Training useful but not essential. Specifically<br>for occupational incidents. Designed for use<br>in all industries  |
| 22. | TapRooT®   | 1        | 1     | 1         | 1                               | 1                     | 1                                    | 1                               | 1         | 1                   | Solutions module available soon. Method<br>includes advanced interviewing techniques<br>for investigation   |
| 23. | Kelvin Top-Set®  | 1        | 1     | 1         |                                 | 1                     | 1                                    | 1                               |           | 1                   |   |
| 24. | TRACEr – Technique for<br>Retrospective and Predictive<br>Analysis of Cognitive Errors |          | 1     |           | 1                               | 1                     |                                      |                                 |           | 1                   | Forms part of the HFAT methodology  |
| 25. | Tripod Beta  | 1        | 1     | 1         | 1                               | 1                     | 1                                    | 1                               |           |                     | Does not provide ready-made solutions but<br>leads the analysis back to basic risk factors<br>that form the key elements of improvements  |
| 26. | WBA – Why Because<br>Analysis  | _        | 1     |           | 1                               |                       | 1                                    |                                 |           |                     |   |
| 27. | 5 Whys   |          | 1     |           |                                 |                       | 1                                    |                                 |           |                     | A simple method for exploring issues  |
| 28. | Why tree   |          | 1     |           |                                 |                       | 1                                    |                                 |           |                     |   |

#### Near misses with high potential risk should be investigated thoroughly



#### **Example Consequences**

| Fatalities, major fire-explosion, gas leak |
|--|
| Permanent disability, fire, minor gas leak |
| Lost time injury, RIDDOR reportable        |
| Medical treatment injury, minor fire       |
| First aid treatment, limited plant damage  |
|  |

|   | E1               | E2       | E3            | E4              | ES                      |
|---|------------------|----------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| E | 10               | 14       | 21            | <sup>23</sup> V | <b>SI</b> <sup>25</sup> |
|   | D1               | D2       | D3            | D4              | D5                      |
| D | 9                | 13       | <sup>18</sup> | 22              | 24                      |
|   | C1               | C2       | C3            | C4              | C5                      |
| c | 4                | 7        | 17            | 19              | 20                      |
|   | B1               | B2       | B3            | B4              | B5                      |
| В | 2                | 5        | 8             | 15              | 16                      |
|   | A1               | A2       | A3            | A4              | A5                      |
| Α | 1                | 3        | 6             | 11              | 12                      |
|   | 1                | 2        | 3             | 4               | 5                       |
|   | Very<br>unlikely | Unlikely | Possible      | Likely          | Very<br>likely          |

Figure 9: Risk matrix



Figure 2: Incident causation model

Learning from incidents, accidents and events manual Aug 2016 EI










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















Ref Tripod beta user guide 2007

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