



# Deflagration during nightshift

and a short digression about safety culture

# **Alexander Thomas**



### **Structure**

- the administrative district Arnsberg from the major hazard point of view
- deflagration during nightshift
- safety culture (a very brief comparison)
- conclusion




### the administrive district Arnsberg from the majaor hazard point of view


127 operating ranges under Seveso directive (637 in NRW)

- 69 lower-tier establishments
- 58 upper-tier establishments thereof: 40 surface planting and 10 in which explosives are dealt with

### branches overview

- surface planting, staining
- chemical industries (pharmaceutical, varnishes, special
- chemistry,...)
- powerstations
- biogas facilities
- storage (petrochem., fl. gases, explosives, fertilizer,...)
- waste management facilities (chemical-physical treatment, storage..)
- miscellaneous





### the administrative district Arnsberg from the majaor hazard point of view

# Tasks of the major hazard team / Störfallteam (2 senior service, 5 inspectors)

- participation on preliminary discussions on legal obligations
- "preliminary examination" on behalf of article 15 Seveso-III-directive
- statement in approval procedures
- examination of notifications to Art. 7, Seveso-III-directive
- the "governmental duties"
  - assessment of safety reports
  - reporting duties to the EU

- identification of domino effects
- implementation a system of inspections

- · accident investigation
- statement to safety distance issues
- if appropriate participation on IED inspections
- participation on national & international exchange of experiences




### the "big bang theory"

- deflagration: subsonic combustion propagating through heat transfer and pressure
  - → pressure resulting from emerging and expanding gas

• explosion: supersonic combustion with shock wave



### **Deflagration during nightshift - overview**



Upper-tier establishment

Under umbrella of an authorization holder and several other companies

### **Deflagration during nightshift - event**

- facility to produce solid fuel during the recondition of raw materials in a kneader (homogenization & desorption of water remains)
- rapid implementation/deflagration
- fire was under control after about one hour (about 80 men and women emergency personal, fire fighter, first responder etc.)

- 02:48: UV-flame detector triggered signal towards fire alarm system activation of spray extinguishing system
- 02:56: first fire engine in action



### **Deflagration during nightshift - effects**

- destruction of operational infrastructure due to the deflagration (pressure wave)
- further destruction due to fires within the building (basement and lower outside) as a result of flame front and flame propagation
- one injured operator
- material damage is estimated at 150.000 € (at the time of the incident)



### **Deflagration during nightshift - analysis**

### preserved data

- performance data from drive motor of the kneader was stored
- raising power consumption logged (16 instead of 15 kW) within an extreme short period before the incident
- first indicator of a possible cause
- Ignition?



### **Deflagration during nightshift - analysis**

- BAM (federal institution of material testing) is appointed with incident investigation by the company (almost on the spot)
- material testing by a chair for material science of a nearby university



### **Deflagration during nightshift analysis**

### conclusion:

- breakaway at the edge of the kneader shaft lead to increased friction,
  because the fragment disabled the concentricity
- breakaway due to changed hardness courses and structural changes

### measures taken:

- increase of production safety primary measures
- increase of structural safety level- secondary measures





production unit before





production unit / box afterwards











exterior view from box to wall





inside view box, kneader and housing devastated





inside view kneader, housing devastated, corrosion due to spray



emergency exit



exterior view: access to basement





escape route



exterior view: access to basement





exterior view: access to basement





**inside basement:** result of flame front propagation squeeze water barrels filled





**inside basement:** result of flame front propagation remains of empty squeeze water barrels





kneader waves removed





"Corpus Delicti"? a piece from the kneader, found during the examination



### safety culture (a very brief comparison)


Extreme short comparison with a catastrophic fire in a surface planting company







### safety culture ( a very brief comparison)



"What can WE do to prevent such an incident under all circumstances in the future?"

Vgl. Vortrag: ErFa Berlin 2015, Sicherheitskultur

we start

again?"

### safety culture ( a very brief comparison)

# safety management reflects safety culture



# Thank you for your attention!

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